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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 13-4734
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ROBERT STINSON, JR.,
Appellant
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 2:10-cr-00724-001)
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 1, 2014
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 16, 2014)
_____________
OPINION*
_____________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Robert Stinson, Jr. appeals the 324-month prison sentence imposed after
this Court vacated his initial 400-month prison term. See United States v. Stinson, 734
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2013). Stinson claims that the District Court erred procedurally by
rejecting his forensic psychologist’s conclusions upon which his mitigation arguments
rested. Discerning no error in the District Court’s consideration of the psychologist’s
opinions, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
From 2006 through 2010, Stinson solicited over $17 million from hundreds of
individuals for a sham investment fund called “Life’s Good.” On August 15, 2011,
Stinson pleaded guilty to five counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; four
counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; nine counts of money laundering,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957; one count of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1344; three counts of filing false tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206; two counts
of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505; and two counts of making false
statements to the federal government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
The District Court sentenced Stinson to 400 months’ imprisonment, a sentence
that was approximately 10% above the advisory guidelines range of 292 to 365 months.
On appeal, we concluded that the District Court had erred in applying a two-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) for deriving $1 million or more from a
financial institution. Stinson, 734 F.3d at 181. On remand, the District Court recalculated the advisory guidelines range to be 235 to 293 months, a range that Stinson
does not contest. The District Court again varied upward by approximately 10%,
imposing a prison term of 324 months. Stinson timely appealed.
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II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
III.
Stinson’s sole argument on appeal is that the District Court committed procedural
error by rejecting the testimony of defense witness Dr. Catherine Barber. Prior to
sentencing, Dr. Barber conducted a three-hour interview with Stinson, administered
psychological tests, read the Presentence Investigation Report (including victim impact
statements), and reviewed the indictment. Based on this information, she issued a report
and testified at the initial sentencing hearing that Stinson met the criteria for narcissistic
personality disorder.
Consistent with this diagnosis, defense counsel argued that Stinson’s grandiose
and unreasonable estimation of his own capabilities led him to believe that his business
activities would prove wildly successful and generate huge returns for investors. Arguing
that “this is not a case in which [the defendant] stole in a cold-blooded manner[,]” (App.
207), and that Stinson’s narcissistic personality disorder is amenable to psychological
treatment, the defense requested a sentence below the advisory guidelines minimum of
235 months.
The District Court was not swayed by this argument. Recognizing that the
requested downward variance rested upon Dr. Barber’s conclusions, the District Court
stated:
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. . . I first want to say that I reread Dr. Barber’s report, and I
give low weight to her opinions. I don’t dispute her expertise
or her knowledge, but she relies very heavily on what Mr.
Stinson told her . . . and I don’t think he’s a reliable person in
any way, shape, or form by virtue of the extensive fraud that
he committed on so many victims here . . . .
(App. 215.)
Stinson asserts that the District Court’s statement reveals a fundamental
misunderstanding of the bases for Dr. Barber’s conclusions. Far from relying on what he
had told her, asserts Stinson, Dr. Barber actually relied upon victim statements in the
Presentence Investigation Report to form her opinion that “Stinson was a ‘perfect fit’ for
the criteria of a narcissistic personality disorder.” (Appellant’s Brief at 20.) According
to Stinson, Dr. Barber quoted statements Stinson made, not for their truth, “but to
illustrate his exaggerated sense of his talents and capacities.” (Id.)
The point made by the District Court, however, is that Dr. Barber necessarily had
to rely upon what Stinson told her, not for the truth of what he said, but for the purpose of
making her diagnosis, and Stinson wanted to use that diagnosis to reduce his punishment.
The District Court took into account Stinson’s success as a con artist, bilking investors of
more than $17 million and even deceiving a well-regarded investment-rating agency,
Morningstar, Inc., in deciding to accord little weight to Dr. Barber’s opinion.
Where, as here, the defendant asserts that an incorrect factual determination
resulted in a procedural error in imposing the sentence, we apply the “clear error”
standard of review. See United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 119 (2014). Under
the clear-error standard, it is our responsibility “to accept the ultimate factual
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determination of the fact-finder unless that determination either (1) is completely devoid
of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no
rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” DiFederico v. Rolm Co., 201
F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
We cannot say that the District Court clearly erred in finding that Dr. Barber relied
heavily on Stinson’s statements in arriving at her conclusions. Indeed, her conclusions
necessarily depended upon Stinson’s own statements regarding his personality and
mindset. She interviewed only Stinson. The District Court had before it a record of
sophisticated deceptive conduct by Stinson that continued even after his arrest on the
underlying charges. The record supported a rational conclusion that Stinson was an
inveterate manipulator, thereby justifying the District Court’s decision to discount any of
Dr. Barber’s conclusions that depended on Stinson’s statements.
Because the District Court did not err in according little weight to Dr. Barber’s
opinions, there is no need to speculate about how the District Court might have
considered Stinson’s mitigation arguments that rested on Dr. Barber’s conclusions.1 It is
sufficient to observe that there was ample support for the sentence imposed in this case.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

1

Stinson does not challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.
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